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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
No. 15786

-v-

REX GLEN FOUST,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was convicted of the crime of incest
in violation of Section 76-7-102, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
and appeals.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before an eight-person jury in
the Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County,
State of Utah, before the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer.

The jury

returned a verdict of guilty as charged and the defendant
appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have his conviction reversed
or, in the alternative, to have this case remanded for a new
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trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Rex Glen Foust was charged and convicted
of the crime of incest in violation of Section 76-7-102, Utah
Code Annotated (1953).

On November 15, 1977, the case came

on for jury trial in the Second Judicial District Court in
and for Davis County, State of Utah, before the Honorable
J. Duffy Palmer, presiding.
Kathryn Foust, a witness for the State, testified
that she met the appellant when she was eight years of age.
(Tr. 5.)

Kathryn Foust was legally adopted by the appellant

when she was eight years old.

(Tr. 5.)

The witness further testified that she was sixteen
years of age when the alleged crime of incest took place.
(Tr. 4.)

Her testimony leading up to the alleged crime showed

that she desired to go to a school Christmas dance (Tr. 7);
and that Kathryn's mother said she would have to ask her stepfather, the appellant, for his permission to attend the dance.
(Tr. 7.)
On the date of the alleged incident, December 1976,
she questioned the appellant about going to the dance.
There was no one else in the house at the time.

(Tr· 8.'

(Tr. 8.)

The

witness testified that on two separate occasions, that same
afternoon, the appellant fondled her breasts.

(Tr. 9, 10.)

When she asked if she could go to the dance, the appellant
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responded by asking if she wanted "to play."

(Tr. 11.)

The following testimony of Kathryn Foust is taken
from the transcript:
figured I wanted to go to
the girls' dance so I consented.
(Tr. 11.)

I

On cross-examination she testified:
I wanted to go to the dance so
I decided to have relations.

(Tr. 17.)
The witness and the appellant allegedly went to his
(Tr. 12.)

bedroom and had sex.

Consequently, she was per- _,.

mitted to go to the school dance.

(Tr. 14.)

Kathryn Foust's testimony was the only evidence
offered by the State to establish that the appellant committed
the alleged crime.

No other evidence was offered to corrobo-

rate her testimony.

At the conclusion of her testimony, the

State rested its case.

(Tr. 18.)

Defense counsel moved to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds of insufficient evidence.

(Tr. 19.)

Counsel

argued that Kathryn Foust was over the age of fourteen and
consented to the act (Tr. 19); and that she was therefore an
accomplice to the alleged offense.

(Tr. 19.)

As an accom-

plice, it was argued, her testimony must be corroborated to
sustain th.e. conviction.

(Tr. 19.)
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The Court denied counsel's motion to dismiss.
19.)

(Tr.

The judge concluded that a person must be eighteen years

or older to be an accomplice by statute (Tr. 19, 20) and entered a judgment of guilty.

ARGUMENT
THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF A MINOR,
AGE SIXTEEN AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED
OFFENSE, WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO
CONVICT THE APPELLANT OF INCEST, WHEN
THE MINOR VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY
PARTICIPATED IN THE UNLAWFUL ACT.
A.

The testimony of an accomplice
must be corroborated in order to
sustain a conviction.

The testimony of an accomplice is, as a matter of

law, insufficient to sustain a conviction unless it is corrobo
rated by other competent evidence.

Section 77-31-18, Utah

Code Annotated (1953) provides:
Conviction on testimony of accomplice. --A conviction shall not be
had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated
by other evidence, which in itself
and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends to
connect the defendant with the
conunission of the offense; and the
corroboration shall not be sufficient, if it merely shows the
conunission of the offense or the
circumstances thereof.
Section 77-31-18 supplements the policy that testimony of an
accomplice shall be regarded with distrust by barring a
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conviction of a defendant based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, even though such testimony
of an accomplice may convince the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The requirement of Section 77-31-18 is in addition to

the requirement of the doctrine of reasonable doubt; it in
effect says that even though the jury is convinced to a moral
certainty that the defendant is guilty, it still must acquit
him if the testimony of the accomplice is uncorroborated.
B.

A minor, age sixteen, who voluntarily and knowingly participates
in an act of incest is an accomplice to the crime whose testimony must be corroborated to
sustain a conviction.

This court has set up a two-prong test to determine
if a party to a criminal act is an accomplice.

The first

requirement before one can be held to be an accomplice is that
the party voluntarily and knowingly united with another in the
commission of a criminal act.

State v. Georgopoulos, 492 P.2d

1353 (Utah 1972); State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977).
The second requirement is that the party could have been
prosecuted for the identical offense charged the defendant on
trial.

State v. Fertig, 233 P.2d 347 (Utah 1951); State v.

Georgopoulos, supra.

Generally, the question of whether or

not the alleged accomplice possessed the requisite mental
state is a question for the jury, while the second requirement
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is a question of law for the judge.

State v. Fertig, supra.

The aforementioned allocation of duties between the jury and
the judge is modified only when the alleged accomplice is,
as a matter of law, deemed incapable of possessing the requisite mental state.
In Utah a person under the age of fourteen is, as a
matter of law, incapable of being an accomplice to any criminal act because those persons less than fourteen years old
are not criminally responsible for their conduct.

Section

76-2-301, Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides:
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct performed before
he reaches the age of fourteen
years.
Likewise, Section 76-5-406, Utah Code Annotated (1953) specifies that a person under fourteen years of age is incapable of
consenting to an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, or sexual
abuse which thereby precludes those under fourteen from possessing the requisite mental state to be deemed to be an
accomplice.
Conversely, those minors fourteen years old and
older are deemed capable of having the mental capacity to con·
sent to and commit crimes for which they are criminally accoun:
able.
In addition to the above statutes, which deal
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directly with criminal responsibility and consent, Section
76-5-401, Utah Code Annotated (1953), Unlawful Sexual Intercourse, indirectly deals with the age at which minors are
deemed capable of assenting to sexual acts.

It provides:

(1) A male person commits unlawful sexual intercourse if he has
sexual intercourse with a female,
not his wife, who is under sixteen
years of age.
(Emphasis added.)
The clear import of the Criminal Code, when considered in its entirety, is that a minor, at the age of sixteen, can voluntarily and knowingly participate in a criminal
act and is capable of consenting to those acts.

By virtue of

Section 76-2-301 and Section 76-5-406, there appears to be no
legal bar to a finding that a person fourteen years or older
is an accomplice.

Absent such a legal bar, the question of

whether or not a minor voluntarily and knowingly participated
in the criminal act is a question for the jury.
Fertig, supra.

State v.

Logically, if one can be held criminally

responsible for an act, he can also be an accomplice thereto,
and there can be no doubt that if a minor is found to be an
accomplice then Section 77-31-18 requiring corroboration would
apply.
Assuming, arguendo, that a minor, age sixteen, is
capable of possessing a requisite mental state to be held to
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be an accomplice by the jury, the judge must then deal with
the second prong of the test laid down by this court; i.e.,
that the accomplice could be charged with the identical offense which the defendant at trial is accused.
The statute governing the charging of juvenile provides that in the case of all felonies, a minor can be, if
the State so desires, be charged as an adult under the Criminal Code.

Section 55-10-86, Utah Code Annotated (1953) pro-

vides as follows:
Felony committed by child-Hearing and certification to
district court.--If the petition
in the case of a person fourteen
years of age or older alleges
that he committed an act which
would constitute a felony if
committed by an adult, and if
the court after full investigation and a hearing finds that it
would be contrary to the best
interests of the child or of the
public to retain jurisdiction,
the court may enter an order
certifying to that effect and
directing that the child be held
for criminal proceedings in the
district court, with a hearing
before a committing magistrate
to be held as in other felony
cases. The provisions of section
55-10-96 and other provisions
relating to proceedings in
children's cases shall, to the
extent they are pertinent, be
applicable to the hearing held
under this section.

When a criminal complaint is
filed in a court of competent
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jurisdiction charging the child
with the offense certified under
this section, the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court is terminated
as to the child or person concerned.
The fact that minors are not ordinarily prosecuted
in the criminal courts in our society today does not detract
from the fact that minors could be accused of the same offense
for which a principal is charged under the aforecited statute.
In view of the fact that incest in violation of
Section 76-6-102, Utah Code Annotated (1953) is a third degree
felony, and therefore a crime which a minor could be charged
with under Section 55-10-86, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as an
adult, the second prong of the applicable test has been met.
Unlike the crimes such as "carnal knowledge,"
"statutory rape," or "contributing to the delinquency of a
minor," both parties to an act of incest, assuming the requisite legal age and mental state, could be charged with the
identical crime.
This court has not directly ruled on the application
of Section 77-31-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953)

(corrobora-

tion) to a charge of incest under Section 76-7-102, Utah Code
Annotated (1953) where the complaining witness was a minor,
age sixteen.

However, this court dealt with the general issue

of the need for corroboration in a similar case, State v.
~.

308 P.2d 264 (Utah 1957).

In Clawson the defendant
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was convicted of sodomy based on the sole uncorroborated tes:;
mony of the prosecutrix.

This court reversed the conviction,

holding that it was error on the part of the trial court to
have refused the requested instruction concerning the need
for corroboration.

See also State v. Thompson, 87 P. 709

(Utah 1906); State v. Kimball, 146 P. 313 (Utah 1915) which
required corroboration in adultery cases; and State v. Huntsmo·
204 P.2d 448 (Utah 1949) which held that under the prior
criminal code corroboration was not necessary in a case involving "carnal knowledge."
Numerous other jurisdictions have considered the
more specific issue of whether corroboration is required where
a minor voluntarily participates in an unlawful sexual act
with an adult and the minor is later the complaining witness.
Those jurisdictions which have considered the issue have
almost uniformly held that corroboration is necessary in order
to sustain the conviction.

19 A.L.R.2d §§ 9 & 21, Wharton's

Criminal Evidence 13th ed., Vol. 3 § 647.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Motherly v. State,
71 P.2d 1094 (Okla. 1937) dealt with an almost identical fact
situation as is presented by this appeal.

In that case the

defendant was convicted of incest based on the testimony of
his daughter that he had had sexual relations with her over a
period of years from the time she was fourteen until she was
twenty.

The.~aughter was the only witness presented by the
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State on direct examination.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court

reversed the defendant's conviction holding:
We believe that under the facts
in this case the court should
have determined as a matter of
law, the question as to whether
or not the evidence show that
prosecutrix had voluntarily
committed the act and should
have told the jury that under
such testimony she was an
accomplice and it was necessary
for her testimony to be corroborated.
More recently the California Supreme Court dealt with this
issue.

In People v. Cox, 227 P.2d 290 (Calif. 1951) the

defendant was charged and convicted with the crime of sodomy;..
The two complaining witnesses were both boys age fourteen.
The evidence established that the boys voluntarily participated in the offense.

The trial court ruled the boys were

not accomplices and therefore their testimony did not need to
be corroborated in order to convict.

The Supreme Court of

Ca.lifornia reversed, holding that, "since the prosecuting
witnesses were of the age of fourteen years, they were capable
of committing a crime, and since they knowingly, freely and
voluntarily participated in acts prohibited by section 288a
of the Penal Code, they were subject to prosecution for violating such section,
was on trial.
timony,

the identical offense for which defendant

Therefore they were accomplices and their tes-

in .. s:irder to sustain a conviction of defendant, must
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have been corroborated in accordance with section 1111 of the
Penal Code."
A review of the more recent cases shows widespread
acceptance of the proposition that the testimony of a minor
who voluntarily and knowingly participates in an illicit

sexu 0

act is an accomplice to the act and therefore the minor's
testimony must be corroborated to sustain a conviction.

State

v. Howard, 400 P.2d 332 (Ariz. 1965), fifteen-year-old girl
held to be an accomplice to lewd and lscivious act; People v.
McRae, 187 P.2d 741 (Calif. 1947), cert. denied, 68 S. Ct.
1511, 334 U.S. 843, 92 L. Ed. 1967, 15-year-old boy was an
accomplice in sexual offense per J. Traynor; People v. Cox,
227 P. 290, 102 C.A.2d 285 (1951), two fourteen-year-old boys
held to be accomplices to act of sodomy whose testimony in
order to sustain the conviction had to be corroborated; Woodv
v. State, 238 P.2d 367 (Okla. 1951), fifteen-year-old boy heLl
to be an accomplice to voluntary sex acts.

See also Wharton's

Criminal Evidence, 13th ed., Vol. 3, § 647.
C.

The trial court erroneously ruled
that the complaining witness
could not legally be an accomplice
to incest and thereby improperly
refused to either instruct the
jury on the need for corroboration
or alternatively to dismiss the
complaint.

The relevant testimony elicited from the prosecutrix at trial was that she was sixteen years old on the day
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of the alleged offense (Tr. 4) and that she voluntarily had
sexual relations with the defendant in order to gain permission to go to a school dance.

(Tr. 11.)

The voluntariness

of the witness's actions is demonstrated by the following
excerpts from the transcript:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
WITNESS KATHRYN FOUST:
I figured
that I wanted to go to the girls'
dance so I consented.
(Tr. 11.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION
Yes, but
WITNESS KATHRYN FOUST:
that isn't really the situation
that you described.
I wanted to
go to the dance so I decided to
have relations.
(Tr. 17.)
No evidence was presented by the State to establish
that the witness was coerced in any way to participate in the
alleged act.

There can be no doubt that the testimony of the

prosecutrix was uncorroborated as she was the sole witness
for the State in its case in chief.

Subsequent to the State

resting, defense counsel moved to dismiss the conplaint on the
grounds of insufficient evidence, submitting to the court that
the witness was an accomplice to the act of incest whose
testimony needed to be corroborated.

(Tr. 19.)

The Court

denied the motion and responded as follows:
COURT:
Eighteen and over is an
accomplice, by the statute.
(Tr.
19.)
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At the close of the trial, but prior to the jury
being instructed, counsel requested the following two instructions:
No. 5. You are instructed that
any person over fourteen years
of age is criminally responsible
for his conduct. Therefore, any
person over the age of fourteen
who willingly participates in a
criminal act is an accomplice to
the crime committed.
No. 6. You are instructed that
a conviction shall not be had on
the testimony of an accomplice,
unless she is corroborated by
other evidence, which in itself
and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends to
connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense; and
corroboration shall not be sufficient, if it merely shows the
commission of the offense or the
circumstances thereof.
The test of sufficiency of
corroborative evidence is that it
need not be sufficient in itself
to support a conviction, but it
must implicate the accused in
the offense, and not be consistent
with his innocence, unless it will
do more than cast a grave suspicion on the accused.
Once again the trial court refused to give the instructions (Tr. 45) and ruled as follows:
It is the opinion of the court
that the age of consent, if at
all, in incest would be at the
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age of eighteen wherein she
becomes an adult and that the
pressure of the father would
indicate whether or not it was
free will consent.
(Tr. 45.)
The trial court clearly committed prejudicial error
in refusing to either instruct the jury on the applicable law
of accomplice and the need for corroboration so that the jury
could determine whether the prosecutrix had the requisite
mental state to be an accomplice or, in the alternative, to
declare as a matter of law, based on the undisputed testimony
of the consent of the prosecutrix, that she was an ac~omplice
and that inasmuch as her testimony was uncorroborated, the
complaint would be dismissed.

./'

CONCLUSION
There can be little doubt that the prosecutrix, being
age sixteen at the time of the alleged unlawful act, was
criminally responsible for her actions, assuming the requisite
mental state, by virtue of Section 76-2-301, Utah Code Annotated (1953).

Likewise, inasmuch as the act committed was

incest, a felony in violation of Section 76-6-102, Utah Code
Annotated (1953), the prosecutrix could have been charged with
the identical offense of incest as the appellant was brought
to trial on.

As such, the prosecutrix in the case at bar was

legally capable of being an accomplice to the crime of incest.
The question which remained at the time the State completed
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its case, and again after defense counsel had rested, was
whether or not the prosecutrix was factually an accomplice to
the alleged criminal act.

The judge thereupon committed pre-

judicial error by either failing to instruct the jury on the
requirements necessary to find the prosecutrix an accomplice
and the incumbent requirement of corroboration of her testimony in order to sustain the conviction or in failing as a
matter of law to find the prosecutrix was an accomplice and
thereby dismiss the complaint as her testimony was uncorroborated.
Wherefore, the appellant respectfully prays that his
conviction be reversed as a matter of law based on the undisputed fact that the prosecutrix consented to the unlawful act
and that her testimony was uncorroborated or, in the alternative, reverse and remand this case for a new trial with the
instruction to the trial court that the jury must be instructec
on the applicable law with regard to accomplices and the need
for corroboration in order to sustain the conviction of the
appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSEN AND HANSEN
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for

Defendant-Appell~t

---~-

By

- I

~--

--~

Phil L. Hansen

~~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of Apellant was served on counsel for the respondent by delivering
two copies thereof to the Office of the Attorney General, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and by mailing two
copies thereof to Steven C. Vanderlinden, Deputy County
Attorney, Davis County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah 84025, in
a postage prepaid envelope on the

\1~

day of July,

1978.
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